(7.)

OUTLINES

OF A

PLAN

FOR THE

GENERAL REFORM

OF THE

BRITISH LAND FORCES.

BY

THE HON. BRIG. GENERAL STEWART,

95TH REGIMENT.

THE SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED.

LONDON:

Printed by C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Temple Bar,

FOR T. EGERTON, AT THE MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL.

1806.

Cambridge, April 23, 1806.

THE following pages will be found to differ, in ſome reſpects, from the preceding edition; more conſideration has been beſtowed upon the ſubject, and although ſtill incomplete, the Author feels it his duty to give publicity to his ſentiments, as now corrected: if by any communication of his reflections he be ſo fortunate as to call attention to the great national queſtion, the Improvement of the Military Eſtabliſhment, or to ſuggeſt one idea which may tend to the benefit of his country, the object which he has in view will be obtained.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Author of the following pages ventured, about twelve months ago, to ſubmit to the conſideration of the public ſome ſuggeſtions relative to a general reform in the military eſtabliſhment of this country. The neceſſity which then exiſted for reform, has, by ſubſequent events, been increaſed tenfold.

We have an Enemy to contend with, who aims at nothing leſs than the ſubjugation of the whole civilized world, and among the number of whoſe victims, although probably the laſt, we may expect to fall, unleſs energies ſimilar, in degree, to his own, be exerted on our part. We muſt depend ſolely on our own efforts for the protection of our rights, for the vindication of our rank and conſequence, as an independent

nation ; foreign alliance muſt be baniſhed from our calculation, and whether we receive aid or not from abroad, to operate a diverſion of the enemy's force, we muſt act as if the whole brunt of his hoſtility were to be reſiſted by our own unaſſiſted exertions.

To this important object the attention of Government has, at length, been ſeriouſly directed; thoſe who attempt the ſalutary reform will have much difficulty and prejudice to encounter, for ſuperficial obſervers will ever endeavour to diſcredit the larger views of more comprehenſive minds. The nation is however prepared for the reception of meaſures which may render it both ſecure and formidable; a complete renovation muſt be produced on the public mind with regard to the ſyſtem of defence, and to the military ſervice in general.

In the following outline, which is brought into as conciſe a form as the nature of the ſubject will admit, it is hoped, that the diſintereſted and truly patriotic, will find ſuch improvements propoſed, as may be immediately adopted, and are conſiſtent with the preſent circumſtances of the nation. Suggeſtions which recommend ſimplicity and œconomy cannot, now, be ill-timed.

So

So critical a period being therefore arrived, it becomes the more neceſſary to take an enlarged view of the preſent ſtate of our land forces: the aſpect of affairs on the Continent is, in fact, ſo ſerious, that there ſeems to be no other alternative for this country, than to adopt meaſures of uncommon vigour in her war department, or to ſubmit diſgracefully to her enemies. France has aſſumed the character of a nation of warriors; the Britiſh empire muſt acquire a new character likewiſe. Its exiſtence and its honor will hereafter depend on the good organization of the naval and military eſtabliſhments, on full ſucceſs attending the national levies, on the army poſſeſſing the higheſt diſcipline and patriotiſm, and on the adoption of ſuch political meaſures as ſhall create a general partiality for the profeſſion of arms.

Without a radical change in our preſent military ſyſtem, Britain will certainly not long continue to be either formidable abroad, or ſecure at home. The contemplation of *invaſion* has hitherto abſorbed our whole attention, our views have been too much confined to feeble and ineffectual means of ſecurity, and the ſpirit of a free people, "whoſe exiſtence ſhould be identified with "their glory," has been hitherto called forth to

act on the defenſive alone: every military meaſure, during this war, inſtead of having embraced general objects, ſeems almoſt excluſively to have pointed to the ſolitary poſſibility of invaſion.

Previous to the inveſtigation of a ſyſtem which may appear to require reform, the general nature and object of military eſtabliſhments ſhould be conſidered; the ſubject ought to be taken up on an extenſive ſcale; thoſe original principles, which operate on mankind by invariable laws, muſt be referred to; the practice of other nations ought never to be loſt ſight of; the prevailing ſentiment in our own country ſhould, in particular, be ſeized, and above all, a union of intereſts, one common feeling, between the ſoldier and the citizen, muſt be created: "The "hearts of the people muſt be ſecured, if we "would preſerve the independence of this coun-"try."*

The natural objects of every military eſtabliſhment muſt be to render a nation ſecure at home, and ſucceſsful in attacking its enemies; this will be found equally intereſting to every

* Cobbet's Political Register.

country:

country: the preſervation or the loſs of a State muſt depend upon the meaſures, which are employed to attain this object, being conducted on true, or on falſe principles: before we, however conſider this ſubject with reference to our own country, a clearer view of our purpoſe will be given by a ſhort recurrence to ſome of thoſe general principles and received opinions, which men of thought and reſearch have adopted.

To the ſuperiority of regular and well diſciplined armies the greateſt revolutions in the affairs of mankind may be aſcribed;* reliance on forces imperfectly diſciplined has ever led to diſaſter, and, on the other hand, in proportion as armies have been effective, they have uniformly proved themſelves to be ſources of internal ſtrength, as well as of extenſive dominion. The only means of giving troops this diſtinctive ſuperiority, is by a judicious courſe of diſcipline, which ſhall, by degrees, mould the intractable paſſions of men into habits in many reſpects repugnant to the feelings of ordinary life, and

* See Smith's Wealth of Nations, part 1, book 5:—the whole of this section should be read by those who bestow attention on military subjects.

by

by the due cultivation of thoſe moral qualities, which are only to be attained by a long proceſs of careful inſtruction. It is not ſo much on mechanical dexterity, as on the acquirement of peculiar moral habitudes that the ſuperiority of regular troops depends; the profeſſion of arms is one of thoſe purſuits in which the mind ſtrongly participates; with regard to our countrymen it is a miſtaken view of the ſubject to conſider it as mechanical.

Some of the ſtrongeſt natural feelings muſt certainly be forced into an artificial direction, and be ſubdued in thoſe, whoſe employments are immediately connected with the preſervation of life, or with the infliction of death; in the profeſſion of ſurgery, or of arms, this fact is ſtrongly marked; and amiable as the heart may naturally be, amidſt ſcenes, which are apparently in oppoſition to every tender feeling, an artificial inſenſibility of mind, the reſult of a long proceſs of diſcipline, muſt be acquired. This diſcipline of the mind is not to be underſtood as excluding it from the reception of milder impreſſions; ſubordination in an army is rendered moſt perfect when authority is ſoftened by the feelings of honor and affection, but in order to attain a full degree of vigor, muſt be incorpo-

rated

rated with the better ſentiments of the heart. It has invariably been the object of great commanders to mingle authority with lenity, to inſpire their troops with confidence in their own capacity, to call forth their enthuſiaſm, and to create a common feeling between the officer and the ſoldier. Upon theſe principles, Frederick, Suwarrow, and the *great* Nelſon acted, and we need not cite further examples.

How theſe principles are to be acted upon to their full extent, or how theſe feelings are to be created, excepting in *regular armies*, it ſeems impoſſible to conceive: without a control of ſuperior efficacy, without a degree of preliminary training, which may reconcile the mind to the horrors of a battle, and to the reſignation of life itſelf, and without ſentiments of honor or feelings of affection, all regulations, which relate to influence on the character, muſt ever be nugatory and uſeleſs: to theſe fundamental ſprings it ſeems, in fact, neceſſary that the whole contrivance ſhould be adapted.

If this view of the ſubject be correct, how will the ſeveral parts of our preſent military ſyſtem be reconciled to common ſenſe, or to any inſight into men and things. Let us inveſtigate

it

it with impartiality, try it on military principles, or by the rules of plain reaſon.

Volunteer force conſidered.

In the Volunteer ſyſtem, generous and patriotic as may be the motives of thoſe whom it includes, there muſt be a total want of control, and of that habit of mind, which progreſſively forms the ſoldiers' character. How is it poſſible to incorporate into this inſtitution any principles of diſcipline, when the officers poſſeſs no power of exacting obedience, no authority by which they can render their favor or their diſapprobation of the ſlighteſt conſequence, or when the perſons thus *nominally* commanded can, by reſignation, at once diſſolve all connection, rendering the enforcement either of public or bye-laws, equally futile. Every perilous profeſſion muſt be upheld by ſome fear of ſhame, or by ſome love of glory, but in this ſyſtem the ſeeds of neither can be traced. No eſtabliſhment can be permanent, which depends on the variable feelings of the multitude, or on the tranſient influence of national alarm.

The whole meaſure, indeed, if we have in view the combating our enemies in the field of battle, the confronting peril with reſolution, and the bearing with patience the evils ſo pecu-

culiarly

culiarly incident to the ordinary operations of war, is calculated to promote the moſt dangerous deception, and to train men to a ſort of mimicry of military evolutions, rather than to form them as ſoldiers, fit for any of the ſtern purpoſes of war. So wide is the difference between the diſcipline of the mind, and the preciſion of *tactique*, that the want of the latter, which is obſervable in the manœuvring of any French brigade, formed of troops whoſe character to diſcipline is unqueſtioned, would lead to a concluſion, that ſuch a degree of proficiency muſt have been attained in thoſe qualities which perfect the military character, as actually to ſuperſede the neceſſity of all that ſcientific dexterity, upon which, in leſs diſciplined corps, the whole ſucceſs of the machinery ſeems to depend.

Let it be remembered, that the Volunteer corps will be oppoſed immediately to thoſe veteran armies of France, who, fluſhed with victory, have, for twelve years, been accuſtomed to conquer the fineſt troops in Europe. The phyſical ſtrength, the native valor, and the ardent patriotiſm of our Volunteers, is probably ſuperior to the ſame qualities in any other people in the world; but bravery without diſcipline,

cipline, and without long preparation of the mind for the dreadful trade of war, will not avail. That it is, however, adviſeable, during war and arduous times, to introduce a ſyſtem of voluntary armament, throughout a nation, for the purpoſe of internal good order, for the general diffuſion of the knowledge of arms, and as an occaſional aid to the movements of our regular forces, during invaſion, (the yeomanry cavalry is chiefly alluded to,) is not about to be denied; but that bodies of men, whoſe ſervices and extent of inſtruction ſhall be *voluntary*, and who can be bound by none of thoſe ties ſo immediately connected with diſcipline, as have been above deſcribed, ſhould form a component part of our regular ſyſtem of national defence, in oppoſition to the formidable armies of our enemy, is in no reſpect intended.

Militia. A force conſtituted as the militia, altho' the erroneous principle, on which it has hitherto been levied, be abandoned, muſt, by the nature of its limited ſervice, be for ever defective in theſe moral qualities, which have been ſtated as eſſential to the military character. In that ſervice control may exiſt, but the relation between the officer and the ſoldier, which, in regular armies, conſtitutes the baſis of all diſcipline, is of ſo relaxed a deſcription, that it is difficult to trace

trace its effects in the militia regiments. It is natural to admire thoſe who have expoſed themſelves to danger, and from admiration to feel an inclination to imitate; this propenſity cannot however exiſt in a force, where the officers and the oldeſt ſoldiers, have probably never had an opportunity of encountering a ſingle peril of war. Thoſe principles of honor and enthuſiaſm, which enable men to overcome the original weakneſs of human nature, to await the approach of danger without diſmay, and to ſtand the ſhock and carnage of ſuch hoſtile battalions, as honored the field of Auſterlitz by their ſteady valor, theſe principles can, in a militia force, never be matured. The officers, in particular, who enter upon the duties of the profeſſion as an amuſement, more than as a ſcientific purſuit, will never be animated to any valuable exertion of talent or duty, while the former motive prevails, nor until their adherence to the profeſſion becomes an object of anxious ambition, and a *means* of *livelihood.*

If the external appearance of a large proportion of the militia, as to dreſs or even as to manœuvre, be contraſted with that of the regular regiments, the difference may not be conſiderable; but the queſtion is—can moral qualities be

be created without previous cultivation, can that immovable front, that *æs triplex circa pectus*, ſo indiſpenſable in the day of battle, be poſſeſſed, without danger or hardſhips having ever been experienced?—and not whether evolutions ſhall be beſt performed by the regular or the irregular force, when no enemy is at hand to diſturb the proceedings of either?

Additional force.

In the *additional force*, the important objects which are required from effective armies, may, in a greater degree be attained, the ſervice being leſs limited than in the militia, and the officers being thoſe of the regular army. The principal error has hitherto been in the compulſory nature of its levy, and in its injurious effects, in common with other temporary eſtabliſhments, upon the recruiting of our regular forces. But as that part of the meaſure is likely ſoon to be abandoned, further remarks upon this force will be deferred until a ſubſequent part of this treatiſe.

The concluſion, which it is natural to draw from theſe reflections is, that effective and well diſciplined forces are the beſt, (they will ultimately be found to be the *cheapeſt* for every ſtate) and that, without the agency of theſe, Great Britain

Britain can never be ſecure at home, command dominion abroad, and far leſs effect that revolution in the political world, which may reſtore Europe to any degree of *equilibrium.*

That an efficient and powerful army, under the immediate control of government, is now indiſpenſable to our very exiſtence as a nation, no one will deny: that the aggregate of our various deſcription of force even exceeds, in number, the whole regular army of France, is equally true; but it is patriotiſm under the influence of firm diſcipline, more than numbers, which conſtitutes the ſtrength of armies. If ſtanding armies be, therefore, ſo much preferable to temporary levies, the object moſt worthy of conſideration muſt be, how to clear the machine of all obſtructions which may impede its motion, and how to raiſe ſuch a proportion of land force as ſhall be adequate, in every reſpect, to the peculiar exigencies of the ſtate. The whole military eſtabliſhment muſt, in this caſe, accord with the national feelings of the time, be as ſimple as poſſible in its principle, and be founded on ſuch meaſures as may be eaſily carried into execution: "plans of defence on which all men

 are

" are to act, all men ought to underſtand."* In what degree have theſe conſiderations been attended to in this country?

We have too much reaſon to conclude, by the extreme difficulty with which our levies have been hitherto completed, that the forming them upon any principle of uniſon with national ſentiment has been entirely neglected; the preſent ſtate of our land forces, conſiſting of *four* completely diſtinct deſcriptions of troops, regulars, additional force, militia, and volunteers, indicates alſo that as little attention has, as yet, been given to any regularity or ſimplicity in our plans. Before the great work, however, of amendment is entered upon, it will be prudent to conſider the extent of thoſe means which we already poſſeſs, and the comparative riſque incurred by reform. Alterations ought to be more than ſpecious, they muſt be deciſively for the better, or are to be adopted with great caution; if their utility, on the other hand, be demonſtrated, and a clear view of probable conſequences be given, it will be the conſummation of weakneſs to delay them. " The ſeaſon of peril and of deep " anxiety, the ſeaſon that rivets on the public

* Cartwright's Ægis.

" intereſt

" intereſt national attention, raiſing in the pub-
" lic cauſe national energy, and the ſeaſon when
" ſelfiſhneſs and faction dare not encounter the
" public eye, this is the ſeaſon for reformation."*

Our enemy is graſping at univerſal empire; he gives us no time to loſe, and ſcarcely a choice, unleſs between defeat and victory.

Many words need not be expended to prove that the ſyſtem of our levies has hitherto been confuſed and complicated in the extreme; it has appeared to delight in the moſt unnatural combinations; to have introduced into the *regular army*, a ſpecies of voluntary ſlavery, which ſervice for life may juſtly be termed; to have converted pariſh officers into recruiting ſerjeants, as in the *additional force;* to have debarred one important branch of our eſtabliſhment, the militia, from the ordinary chance of encountering a foe, or experiencing military hardſhips; and finally, to have produced, as in the *volunteer force*, ſoldiers who are not ſubject to martial law. The actual exiſtence of four unconnected plans, for the attainment of one object, muſt ſuffice to demonſtrate, that the mea-

* Cartwright's Ægis.

ſures which have been, of late years, purſued cannot, according to the premiſes already advanced, be founded on good ſenſe; the whole ſyſtem of national defence has, in fact, been for many years, diſturbed, and as it were, paralized by the jarring operation of contradictory plans. An army can only fulfil its office effectually when the ſyſtem for its appointment, its maintenance, the direction of its operations and the preſervation of its diſcipline is both regular and ſimple; in proportion as this ſyſtem is defective, the army muſt approach to decay.

The increaſe of the regular forces being therefore eſſential to the glory and to the ſecurity of our country, the mode of effecting this increaſe muſt be that which ſhall be the leaſt expenſive to the ſtate, and which ſhall be promoted by poſitive encouragement, by honors privileges and rewards, peculiar to the profeſſion of arms. Attachment to that profeſſion may be eaſily created, and armies may, by judicious meaſures, be raiſed among our countrymen, to any amount, without recurrence to ballot and meaſures of compulſion, or to the preſent degrading and expenſive ſyſtem of mercenary temptations. "As much alliance of intereſt, and as much intercourſe of ſentiment

"mu

" muſt, at the ſame time, be maintained be-
" tween the military part of the nation, and the
" other orders of the people, as ſhall be conſiſt-
" ent with the diſcipline of an army."* The watchful jealouſy of Parliament cannot fail of being annually excited over theſe ſtanding armies, and the greater part of thoſe conſequences, which are ſuppoſed to attach to this deſcription of force, are too diſtant and too little connected with our preſent critical ſituation, to be within the range of rational ſpeculation. It will, indeed, be ſcarcely poſſible that our land force ſhould be converted into an engine of arbitrary power, while the officers of rank continue to be cloſely connected with the natural ariſtocracy of the country.† Unleſs the ſoldiery can be detached from all ſympathy of feeling with the body of the people, it can ſcarcely be imagined that they will become inſtrumental in fixing a yoke upon their fellow ſubjects. It

* Cobbett's Register.

† " Where the ſovereign is himſelf the general, and the prin-
" cipal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers
" of the army; where the military force is placed under the
" command of thoſe who have the greateſt intereſt in the ſup-
" port of the civil authority, becauſe they have themſelves
" the greateſt ſhare of that authority, a ſtanding army can
" never be dangerous to liberty."—*Smith's Wealth of Nations, Part* 1, *Book* 5.

muſt however be granted that tyranny aſſumes its ſway by ſilent imperceptible ſteps, and that the ſole command of the military force being in the hands of the executive government, at firſt view may alarm the moſt indifferent patriot. The fact however is, that minor conſiderations muſt ſometimes give way to more preſſing evils, and that whilſt a faſtidious jealouſy, at confiding the whole force of the empire to the hands of the executive government alone, may be too long perſiſted in, the day of trial may at once deprive us of that empire, that conſtitution, and the whole of thoſe civil and political rights, for the preſervation of which the conteſt has been ſo long maintained. If we dare not rely on the general complexion of manners, on the general attachment to liberty, which all claſſes among us feel, and on an amelioration of the military ſtate, for our being ſecure, both at home, and from abroad, it is not in the power of human intellect to deviſe means which ſhall remove thoſe unfounded alarms.

After what has been ſaid, *one* extenſive regular army, which ſhall be equally diſpoſable for every military purpoſe, at home or abroad, might, on a firſt view of the ſubject, appear to anſwer our purpoſe moſt effectually; attention muſt,

muſt, however, be given to collateral circumſtances; a deſcription of force, which ſhall be confined to the defence of the empire at home, may be found more congenial to general feelings; it may, therefore, be adviſable to raiſe a *ſecond levy*, excluſively for this limited purpoſe; any farther refinement of ſyſtem for eſtabliſhing the permanent force of this country, will only tend to clog the operation of the whole machine, and divert our attention from the grand object, to which it ought uniformly to be directed.

The following ſuggeſtions will, therefore, be confined to the improvement of the regular army, and to the plan for levying a ſecond force, to be attached to the infantry regiments, in the form of *additional battalions*.

The public attention having, ſince the firſt edition of this treatiſe, been forcibly called to the raiſing of a *ſubſidiary force*, (miſnamed a levy en maſſe), wholly diſtinct from either the regular army, or the additional battalions, a third ſection will be employed in offering ſome obſervations on this ſubject, and on the mode in which the *voluntary* exertions of our countrymen may, with utility, be employed.

SECTION I.

THE REGULAR ARMY.

THE primary objects of reform appear to be the *errors* which have hitherto prevailed in the regular army, the *mode* by which the additional force has been raiſed, the *militia*, and the *expence* of the volunteer infantry. The immediate conſequence of the reform propoſed in two of theſe eſtabliſhments, will be the final termination of thoſe acts of compulſion, which have appeared under the various forms of ballot, aſſeſſment, and fines, and which have actually rendered the office of magiſtrate or pariſh officer irkſome to the more reſpectable claſſes of the community. A more favorable ſentiment towards the military profeſſion may be expected to enſue, when the country ſhall be relieved, (as Mr. Windham propoſed in his ſpeech on the 3d of April), from duties of a nature at once ſo complicated and ſo generally inconvenient. The charge of levying the whole of the land forces ſhould be confided to thoſe who are reſponſible for the employment of them, and the appointment of all officers to thoſe forces entruſted to the Crown alone.

It

It may, at the ſame time, be imprudent to deprive ourſelves of the ſervice of any part of theſe forces, except in proportion as thoſe, which it is propoſed to ſubſtitute in their place, become complete. Much ſanguine expectation may, however, be ſafely indulged, that ſuch a degree of partiality will be created for the military profeſſion, if our armies be new modelled, on the plan about to be ſuggeſted, that the greater part of the additional force and the militia, will transfer their ſervices to the regular army,—that the militia will, at leaſt, aſſimilate their engagement to that of the preſent additional force, and both be conſolidated under the head of the home force;—and that a conſiderable proportion of even the volunteer infantry may be induced to enter the laſt mentioned levy; the preſent militia and addional force are already engaged for the duration of the war, the continuation therefore, of their ſervices, in ſome mode or other, is of courſe to be required. If permanent rank, as high as captain, be on *this peculiar* occaſion, given to the officers of militia and volunteers, in proportion to a ſpecified number of men which they may bring with them into the more regular forces, there is little doubt of the ſucceſs of the meaſure.

In

In order to render the military profeſſion an object of pride and attachment among our countrymen, to implant in the breaſts of our ſoldiers ſome of thoſe patriotic feelings, which are common to citizens of a free country, or rather, which are peculiar to our own, and in order to give to our armies a *ſtimulus* to action, and an attachment to their ſtandards hitherto unknown, numerous obſtacles muſt be removed: thoſe errors which are the moſt prominent in the preſent ſyſtem of things muſt be amended; ſomething new, ſome great change muſt take place, which ſhall produce a powerful effect upon the minds of the nation at large, and of the army in particular.

To deſcribe poſitive abuſes is ever an ungracious taſk; nor are military men in general moſt competent to judge of ſubjects which are not merely profeſſional; with reſpect, however, to particular defects, in any military eſtabliſhment, as they are the firſt who feel the conſequences of them, they may perhaps be more juſtified in pointing them out to public obſervation: the errors which have been chiefly alluded to may be thus claſſed:

1ſt, Perpetuity of ſervice,
2d, Inadequacy of penſions and rewards,
3d, Fre-

3d, Frequency of corporal punifhments,

4th, Length of fervice abroad,

5th, Want of fixed head-quarters in each regiment,

6th, Want of promotion from the lower ranks,

7th, Inadequacy of officers' and non-commiffioned officers' pay.

Service for life.

FIRST. Perpetuity of fervice, or rather an engagement without *limitation of time*, although it be originally founded on a voluntary act, upon the part of the individual who enlifts, is contrary to the genuine fpirit of freedom, and to the ufual practice of thofe ftates which poffefs a liberal fyftem of government: our national character includes ftrong fentiments of independence; this manly feeling fhould be cherifhed, in order to promote cordiality in the execution of duty: it cannot be doubted that the prefent fyftem of enliftment is a principal caufe of the reluctance which is generally fhewn to enter the regular army, and of the enormous defertion which unfortunately prevails.

In lieu of fo indefinite an engagement, a pofitive limit fhould be affixed to the fervices of a foldier; three diftinct periods of enliftment fhould be eftablifhed, *two* of which fhould compriſe

twenty-

twenty-one years, and be for ſervice in the regular regiments of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, and the laſt in veteran battalions. The firſt for *twelve* years; and the ſecond for *nine* years: the third, as the veteran period, to be for *ſix* years. The enliſting into each, to be voluntary, and a ſoldier to have his diſcharge, if he require it, whenever a period expires, except it be during war, when it will be impoſſible to diſpenſe with his ſervice; in this caſe he ſhall continue his ſervice, but receive whatever advantage, in pay, may be attached to the ſecond period: he ſhall be entitled to his diſcharge ſix months after the ratification of peace, unleſs he, in the mean time, regularly enrol himſelf for the whole period. In the event of his doing ſo, credit ſhould be given him for *paſt* ſervice; a ſmall penſion ſhould accompany his diſcharge, at the cloſe of the firſt period, if he will not re-engage.—An increaſe of pay, at the rate of 2d. per day, for the rank of private, 3d. for corporal, and 4d. for ſerjeant, ought to be attached to the ſecond period, and a full bounty be given to a regular re-enliſtment for the whole of it: a penſion, conſiderably increaſed, ought to accompany the diſcharge at the cloſe of the ſecond period; if this period expire during the war the ſoldier to be placed in a veteran battalion; and if he re-engage for the whole of the veteran period, he will be entitled to the

full

full bounty. Any ſoldier having been diſcharged, but willing to re-enter the ſervice, will be placed in it where his previous ſervices may entitle him: of courſe, at the commencement of a period.

It may appear unfair thus to require a continuation of a ſoldier's ſervice, during war, but if the nation give a liberal increaſe to pay for paſt ſervice, and make a permanent proviſion at the cloſe of two fixed periods, it has a right to demand that this ſervice ſhall be given in a manner the moſt beneficial to the State: it is indiſpenſable to ſecure the continued ſervices of trained and experienced men.

The ſoldiers of the ſecond period ſhould bear ſome diſtinguiſhing mark on their dreſs.

The whole of the regular army, now ſerving, can *claim* no exemption from the voluntary engagement already entered into: neither juſtice or liberality demand it; it appears however juſt, that a period ſhould be fixed, (the completion of the twenty-firſt year) on arriving at which every ſoldier ſhould be diſcharged, except it be during war, or placed in a veteran battalion, and receive the advantages which it is propoſed to attach

tach to the completion of the ſecond period: * if the increaſed pay of the ſecond period be at once granted, according as a ſoldier may have entered it, the liberality of the meaſure will have immediate and moſt beneficial effect.

Penſions and rewards

SECOND. If the labourer be worthy of his hire, ſo is he of his reward, if he fulfil his engagement; the term *reward* muſt, however, be employed in a more extended acceptation than that in which it is uſually conſidered; diſtinctions in ſociety, certain rights in common with their fellow ſubjects, and not merely *money*, ſhould be the recompence of our army, in order that we may fill its ranks, and while amply rewarding faithful ſervice, give to every Britiſh ſoldier an intereſt in the country which he defends.

To the completion of the *firſt* period, it may not be adviſable to attach any civil right or immunity, but reſerving theſe as the ultimate re-

* It was suggested in the former edition that, the whole of the regular army now serving should be placed on one or other of the periods, according as *past* service may class each soldier, it being understood that he shall be placed on the first year of each, excepting in the event of twenty-one years having already been completed, in which case he ought to be now placed in a veteran battalion.

The propriety of this measure is still recommended to consideration, and the inequality of the periods will obviate the inconvenience of the general discharge of the present army occurring in one year, in the event of peace.

ward

ward for longer ſervice, merely grant a ſmall penſion,* for thoſe who will not renew their ſervices.

For the *ſecond* period a ſoldier ſhould acquire a right of ſettlement, and of exerciſing a trade in any pariſh of the United Kingdom, upon which he may decide; his penſion ſhould be augmented by one half more than for the former period, and the important civil right of the *elective franchiſe* ſhould be the reward of twenty-one years ſervice in his country's cauſe.†

Veteran-battalions, whoſe extent of ſervice ſhould be limited to the home poſſeſſions, and whoſe period of enliſtment ſhould be only for *ſix* years, may be eſtabliſhed for thoſe old ſoldiers, who having completed their 2d period, ſhall be effective, and ſtill willing to ſerve: no other deſcription of veteran, or, as they are ſometimes termed, garriſon battalions, ſhould be admitted. The full bounty to be given on enliſting, and the increaſed pay of the 2d period, to be that of the veteran ſervice: an augmentation

* This pension to be 6d. per day for privates, and in proportion to non-commissioned officers.

† This may be arranged by causing the soldier's pension to be paid by the receiver general in each county out of the land-tax, thus qualifying him as a freeholder: if pensioners of the first period also, have their option of being so paid, much comfort will accrue to them.

of

of penſion, ſimilar to that of the 2d period, (making up that for the *privates* to 1s. per day,) to follow the veteran's diſcharge: the enjoyment of the civil rights and immunities previouſly ſpecified for the 2d period, to be continued to the veteran, at the concluſion of his military ſervice.

All men diſabled by wounds received in the ſervice, ſhould be penſioners on the pay of the period, in which they may have been ſerving when diſabled, according to their rank.

The widow of a ſoldier killed in action, ought to receive, as a penſion, *one half* of the pay which her huſband may have been receiving at the period of his death: their children ſhould invariably be provided for in a military aſylum.

No ſoldier once diſcharged, or a penſioner, ever to be called upon again for his ſervices, unleſs he voluntarily tender them. The preſent cuſtom of calling on penſioners to ſerve, or forfeit their penſion, and the pitiful allowance, which moſt of them have hitherto received, (4d. per day,) are ſerious cauſes of diſcouragement to the profeſſion in general.

An augmentation of the penſions granted to officers

officers' widows, ſeems likewiſe requiſite; no deduction whatever, in aid of the Chelſea fund, ought to be made from the pay of any officer or ſoldier, in the army; the liberality of the country, muſt, in every inſtance, be manifeſted towards the profeſſion of arms.*

THIRD. No circumſtance can mark a want of juſt diſcrimination, more than the very general recurrence, in any ſtage of ſociety, to that deſcription of puniſhment, which, among the ſame claſs of men, and with the alteration of the profeſſion alone, bears a ſtamp of infamy in the eſtimation of every man. The frequent infliction of corporal puniſhment, in our armies, tends ſtrongly to debaſe the minds, and deſtroy the high ſpirit of the ſoldiery; it renders a ſyſtem of increaſing rigour neceſſary, it deprives diſcipline of the influence of honor, and deſtroys the ſubordination of the heart, which can alone add voluntary zeal to the cold obligations of duty. Soldiers of naturally correct minds, having been once puniſhed *corporally*, generally become negligent and unworthy of any confidence. Diſcipline requires the intervention of ſtrong acts to maintain it, and to impreſs it on vulgar

Corporal puniſhment.

* It may be adviseable to establish a regular system of half-pay for officers, who may have completed a *fixed number* of years service.

minds; punishment may be formidable but must not be familiar: generosity, or solemn severity, must at times be equally recurred to: pardon or death have been resorted to with equal success, but the perpetual recurrence to the infliction of infamy on a soldier by the punishment of flogging, is one of the most mistaken modes, for enforcing discipline, which can be conceived.

In the French army, a soldier is often shot, but he rarely receives corporal punishment, and in no other service is discipline preserved on truer principles.

This abuse of martial law may be restrained within more moderate bounds, by causing the articles of war to specify the crimes which shall merit such punishment; it should be confined to crimes connected with infamy, and to such, as by the municipal law, would meet with nearly similar treatment. It may also be restrained, by requiring courts martial, competent to adjudge it, to be more numerously and respectably composed.

A judicious use of prudential restraints, as confinement, drill, turn-coat, &c. is, in most cases, to be preferred to corporal punishment; in

in ſerious caſes, a deduction might be made from the credit of each ſoldier's ſervice, as was obſerved in the French army. The great object however, in all caſes of crimes, whether of little or great importance, is the ſpecifying the amount and nature of the puniſhment which ſhall follow them: this is the practice in our municipal law, and too wide a deviation from it ſeems to be ſanctioned in the martial code, by the looſe indefinite clauſe in the 24th ſection, "all crimes "not capital, &c."

For the crime of deſertion, the offender ſhould, for the firſt offence, be returned to the 1ſt year of the period he may be in, and for a repetition, be invariably returned to the 1ſt year of the 1ſt period; a third deſertion certainly merits death.

Foreign ſervice.

FOURTH. Prolonged abſence from a native country, naturally creates much reluctance to the profeſſion, which is the cauſe of ſuch abſence: certain regulations ſhould therefore not only be eſtabliſhed, for the quicker ſucceſſion of ſervice in our diſtant colonies, and for the more regular return of a regiment from abroad, but an increaſe of ſervice might be credited for every year paſſed in either Indies. On the return of a regiment from thoſe ſtations, it will be ex-

pedient to allow men to transfer their ſervices to regiments remaining there; ſoldiers enured to thoſe climates being of great value: the bounty on this occaſion to be only *one guinea.*

All ſoldiers who may be diſcharged abroad, ſhould be conveyed home at the expence of government, and receive pay until their arrival at the deſtined port: if the diſcharging a ſoldier during peace, in the diſtant colonies, be attended with inconvenience to the public ſervice, a power may be veſted in the commander in chief there, to detain ſuch ſoldier *ſix months* beyond the expiration of a period, and which detention ſhould be credited to him if he re-engage.

rmanent
oots.

Fifth. Much regularity and public convenience, and a conſiderable degree of attachment to the ſervice, would enſue, if all regiments of cavalry as well as infantry, have fixed depots, after the cuſtom eſtabliſhed by the great Frederick for the Pruſſian army; theſe ſhould be eſtabliſhed in thoſe counties of the United Kingdom, which it is propoſed that each regiment ſhould aſſume the name of, and by which county name, a regiment ought to be as much diſtinguiſhed in future, as by its number: it is conceived that a degree of local attachment, of patriotiſm, and common intereſt with his countrymen, will by theſe

theſe means, be created in every ſoldier: the ſyſtem hitherto purſued, of cauſing regiments to be no where ſtationary, has been at complete variance with this principle.

At theſe depots, the recruits ſhould be collected and diſciplined, and the women, children and ſtores remain there, when detached from the regiment; ſcenes of the greateſt diſtreſs too generally occur among the ſoldiers wives and children, at the embarkation of a corps for foreign ſervice, which not unfrequently cauſe the deſertion of the beſt men in a regiment. A regimental ſchool ſhould alſo be eſtabliſhed at this depot, and to this *home* a corps ſhould invariably return, when not required on ſervice elſewhere.

Promotion of ſoldiers.

SIXTH. As the moſt natural incitement to good conduct, as a ſource of laudable ambition to the lower ranks in the army, and as affording to the inferior orders of the community, an immediate proſpect of bettering their condition, a degree of gradual promotion, from the rank of private to that of officer, ſhould become general throughout the ſervice. A warrant commiſſion of cadet, (ſub-cornet or enſign,) ought to be eſtabliſhed in each troop or company,* (at a pay of 3s. 6d.

* Except the chosen troop or company.

per day for the infantry,) and be a neceſſary intermediate ſtep for a ſerjeant, prior to his being appointed a commiſſioned officer.† Inferior as the quality of a very large proportion of the ſoldiery may at preſent be, from a variety of cauſes, the proſpect of ſuch promotion being but once opened, would not only induce the fineſt young men to quit the militia and volunteer corps, but the ſons of reſpectable families, in the middle claſs of ſociety, would alſo be powerfully attracted.

The ſtricteſt meaſures muſt be adopted for conferring the cadetſhips ſolely on ſerjeants of merit and education; and if a regimental board, conſiſting of *five* field officers and captains, after examination of the claims and merits of the individual, on certain *fixed* heads of military qualification, be required to lay a certificate and memorial of his ability and title to promotion before the colonel of the regiment, previous to appointment; the introduction of unworthy characters into the higher ranks of our army, from this ſource, may be obviated.

That, in the military profeſſion, a ſoldier is,

† If this appointment take place, it will ſupersede the neceſſity of a 2nd lieutenant in each company of infantry or troop of dragoons, except in the *choſen*, vide page 44.

in

in general, precluded from riſing to a higher ſtation, than that of ſerjeant, however great his merit, or viewing that profeſſion as a trade, that the common *artizan* in it ſhould be debarred from the proſpect of becoming an *overſeer*, however long and ſedulouſly performed may have been his apprenticeſhip, are circumſtances which excite an equal degree of ſurpriſe and regret.

Inadequacy of pay.

SEVENTH. Although it cannot be diſputed that regimental officers have general admiſſion into the profeſſion of arms, without the neceſſity and conſequent expence of any *preparatory education whatever*, yet their pay not having kept a proportion with the depreciation in the value of money, has become truly inadequate: the energies of their mind, in lieu of being directed to profeſſional duties, are too frequently exerted, in theſe times, to the keeping themſelves free from pecuniary embarraſſment; it may be adviſeable to increaſe their pay at leaſt 20 per cent. every rank of regimental officers equally requires this aid, and the allowance of forage to field officers ought certainly to be granted, to majors for *two*, and to lieutenant colonels for *three* horſes,* and the indemnification for horſes loſt in ſervice, &c. Many of the allowances which regimental

* This does not allude to the allowance in the field.

officers receive in the field and in barracks, and under the heads of non-effective and contingency, arife from fources fo numerous and fo petty, that they only tend to multiply accounts, both at the regiment and in the War office; means might be adopted, with benefit to the officers and œconomy to the State, for confolidating the greater part of thefe, and for iffuing the whole under *one* head of pay or allowance.

The beft mode of encouraging the private foldier to emulate his fuperiors and to merit promotion, will be by giving every poffible degree of importance to the rank of the non-commiffioned officers: their pay fhould be augmented; that of the ftaff-ferjeants fhould be fixed at 2s. 6d.; of ferjeants at 2s.; and of corporals at 1s. 6d. per day. All thofe petty allowances, known by the terms of extra price of bread and meat, beer money, emery money, and ftationary quarters, the total of which do not exceed 2d. per day, ought, for the fake of fimplicity of accounts, as well as œconomy, to be confolidated, and thrown into the daily pay of each rank.* The difference of pay between a drummer and a

* Thefe confolidated allowances have been included in the pay of the non-commiffioned officers above recommended, and will not cause an increase of more than 1¾d. to the present pay of corporals, nor of more than 3¼d. to that of serjeants.

private

private is unneceſſary, and both ſhould, in future, be fixed at 1s. 2d. per day, including all allowances. The marching money ſhould be completed to 1s. per day. Rations, when iſſued on ſervice, may be charged at an additional price, in proportion to the *fixed* increaſe of pay.

Theſe regulations refer to infantry: the pay of the other forces will be regulated accordingly.

Excluſive of thoſe points which have been adverted to, as requiring moſt immediate reform, there are ſeveral others which call for amendment, if the deſign be to give an entirely new character to the Britiſh ſervice, to induce men of reſpectability and talents to leave the walks of civil life for thoſe of the military profeſſion, to raiſe that profeſſion into a ſcientific purſuit, and to ſurround it with thoſe acceſſions of honor which may at once reconcile it to national feelings.

Officers commiſſions.

FIRST. No ſubject is more open to a diverſity of opinion, than that of His Majeſty's commiſſions being a ſpecies of commercial article. The bare mention of ſuch a circumſtance, impreſſes

preſſes one at firſt with the idea, that it muſt be an abuſe which requires immediate reform: it may, however, be ſhortly ſtated, that the appointment of officers will ever take place by one of three modes—by intereſt, by purchaſe, or by merit; the latter is of courſe the moſt deſirable, but as human nature is conſtituted, the firſt will be found to have moſt ſway. Property, on the other hand, carries with it as good a title to promotion as intereſt, it is infinitely leſs open to abuſe, and in this country has in general been employed as a criterion of *intellectual* qualification. Is military ſkill, then, and preparatory education to have no weight in the choice of thoſe to whom we entruſt the ſecurity of our lives, our property, and our national honor, while, in every other profeſſion, preparatory qualifications are indiſpenſably requiſite: they certainly ought to have an important place, but it may be juſtly obſerved, that the means for eſtimating this ſkill would be open to every degree of undue influence; the perpetual fluctuation of our temporary levies has hitherto precluded all poſſibility of attending to the qualification of officers. As our choice, therefore in this, as in many caſes in life, lies between the leaſt of evils, the object to aim at muſt be, that the appointment and promotion of officers be as free from partiality, and as much the reſult

of

of merit and actual ſervice as poſſible. It will, therefore, be adviſable to enforce the exiſting regulations which relate to commiſſions, and to the ſervice which is required of officers prior to promotion; in order to render theſe regulations the more impreſſive, they ought to be entered in the articles of war, the infringement of them to ſubject the parties to trial, as invariably as for any other act of diſobedience or impropriety.

The general improvement of the profeſſion will give a new character to officers; ſubſequent conſideration may probably ſuggeſt the propriety of their being required to paſs certain examinations, in different ſtages of regimental rank, as in the navy. If theſe examinations on certain points of talent and information were to take place at the three periods of *entering the ſervice*, of becoming a *captain*, and of arriving at the rank of *field officer*, by boards of officers abroad, and at the Horſe-guards, Edinburgh and Dublin, at home; and if theſe teſtimonies of ability were *neceſſarily* to accompany the commiſſions for His Majeſty's ſignature, ſome ſuch plan might entirely do away the ſyſtem of purchaſe, and would evidently introduce a ſuperior claſs of officers into our armies.* A regular ſupply of individuals

* It ſeems impoſſible by academies, maintained at the public

individuals, amply qualified, would offer itſelf from among the cadets in each corps.

Company of merit.

SECOND. Emulation is the ſoul of military improvement, it may be effectually promoted by forming in every regiment of cavalry and battalion of infantry, *one* troop or company, which ſhall take poſt on the *right*, be ſelected ſolely for merit, and every ſoldier in which, without reference to rank, but merely as a diſtinction, ſhall, like the grenadiers in moſt foreign armies, receive the additional pay of *one* penny per day. In the heavy cavalry this may be termed the *cuiraſſier* troop, and in the light, the *huſſar* troop: in the heavy infantry, the *grenadier* company, and in the light infantry battalions, the *chaſſeur* or *riſle* company. From theſe choſen troops and companies His Majeſty's guards ſhould alone be ſelected.

It, therefore, follows, that the preſent ſyſtem of ſelecting men for the grenadier companies, merely on account of their height and appearance, without the leaſt regard to character or talent,

lic expence, to establish a sufficiently extensive system of military knowledge: the mode proposed would obviate this difficulty, as each parent would cause his son to be educated accordingly.

(which

which in grenadier battalions have often decided the fate of battles,) ſhould no longer be adhered to; it likewiſe follows that the plan of having light troops in *whole corps*, as is univerſally the caſe in foreign armies, ſhould be adopted, as preferable to a company being aſſigned to each battalion of infantry, at preſent the caſe in our ſervice. As riflemen, in the uſual acceptation of the term, are merely the *élite* of light troops, their poſt on the right of each light infantry battalion, appears to be more appropriate than in whole bodies, as in the 95th regiment. This ſervice is, however, open to much improvement, and if it were placed on the footing of a corps of ſcience, a very different plan for the diſpoſing of riflemen might be ſuggeſted.

THIRD. It will greatly tend to the benefit of the ſervice, in general, if the regiments of guards be formed on a principle now obſolete, but which originally cauſed the inſtitution of all guards, the ſurrounding a throne with men of eſtabliſhed military character, who ſhould add to its ſecurity as well as to its ſplendor. The guards ſhould become corps ſolely of merit; they ſhould be objects of emulation which ſhould be aſpired to by every regiment in the regular army: all recruiting for the guards ſhould ceaſe, and approved

The guards.

proved men, and diſtinguiſhed officers, from othe corps, (each regiment of the line having it quota to ſupply,) ſhould alone be admitted int their ranks.

It will be expedient, for numerous reaſons, t limit the amount of this force to two regiment of cavalry, of 500 rank and file each, and t *four* regiments of infantry, being *ſingle* batta lions, of 1,200 rank and file each; this force t be in the firſt inſtance formed by a ſelectio from the preſent corps. It will be indiſpenſable for the preſervation of diſcipline, to quarter th guards, or any other regiments which may aid in the duty of the metropolis, in barracks, erected beyond the precincts of the town.

Cavalry. FOURTH. A conſiderable reduction may ſafe- ly be made in the cavalry, excepting in the event of Continental campaigns; the expence of this force, if compared to infantry, appears to bear an unfair proportion; twenty-five regi- ments, or 20,000 rank and file, may probably ſuffice, even if a larger proportion, than is now there, were ſent to India*.

* May it not be advisable to form *four* of the heavy dragoon regiments into light, and abolish the term of *guards* for the heavy cavalry?

FIFTH.

FIFTH. Regularity and method are of equal importance in the field as well as in an office; ſtrict adherence to the regulated eſtabliſhment of each branch of an army, is indiſpenſable for its good organization; we have the example of all foreign armies to guide us on this ſubject; whatever may be fixed as the eſtabliſhment of cavalry, artillery, or infantry, each branch ought preciſely to conform, and no corps in either of the three ſhould differ in its eſtabliſhment from others of the ſame arms. Fixed Eſtabliſhment.

A regiment of artillery ought, in time of war, to conſiſt of 1200 rank and file, horſe included, in twelve troops and companies. A regiment of cavalry of 800 rank and file each, in ten troops*, with only 70 horſes per troop. A regiment of infantry, either *heavy* or *light*, of two battalions of 1000 rank and file each, in ten companies each battalion; and the veteran battalions of 800 rank and file each, in ten companies. All troops and companies ought, by ſpecial order, to be kept nearly equalized in every corps. A recruiting troop or company, conſiſting only of officers and non-commiſſioned officers, ſhould be attached to each regiment of cavalry and ar-

* The cavalry has been lately placed on this establishment.

tillery,

tillery, and to each battalion of infantry, except the veteran battalions.

General Officers.

SIXTH. If all general officers be prohibited from holding regimental commiſſions except as colonels of corps, a more regular diſcharge of regimental duty will be the conſequence, and the ſecond lieutenant-colonels may be generally diſpenſed with; a fixed pay might be eſtabliſhed for general officers upon a plan ſimilar to that of admirals in the navy; in the event of a general officer having purchaſed his regimental commiſſions, the ſale of his lieutenant-colonelcy, at the ſtrict regulation price*, will, if the above ſyſtem be adopted, be of courſe acceded to.

Army Accounts.

SEVENTH. Some plan ſhould be adopted for conſolidating the various allowances and contingencies which are granted to general and other ſtaff officers, and for iſſuing thoſe allowances, as well as their pay, at the ſhorteſt poſſible period after they may be due; this ſuggeſtion extends itſelf to garriſon and military appointments of every deſcription, which are now *intentionally* kept in arrears; an idea appears to be entertained, that a ſaving accrues to the ſtate

* If the pay of officers be encreased, the price of commissions will be regulated accordingly.

by

by thus withholding pay; it ſeems an erroneous one; accounts which are now kept open for two and three years, muſt naturally be attended by numerous war-office and agency expences; an actual increaſe of five per cent. would be made to the pay of the general and ſtaff officers, if it were received when due. All army accounts whatever ſhould be paſſed more quickly, and might be ſimplified by conſolidating petty charges and items in every branch and department; a vaſt ſaving would accrue to the public on this ground alone.

EIGHTH. The drafting of ſoldiers from one corps to another, excepting by their own free choice, ſhould be prohibited; good faith ought, on every occaſion, to be particularly adhered to, and no deluſive proſpects ſhould be held out at the period of enliſtment; a recruit ought to be permitted to engage for a ſpecified regiment, and not for the ſervice in general. So important, in fact, is the neceſſity of impreſſing upon a ſoldier's mind an attachment to his regiment, and to his colours, that, after the manner of the Romans, every recruit, on firſt joining his corps, ſhould, under thoſe colours, and on full parade, have the oath of fidelity, (too careleſsly adminiſtered in general at the period of his enliſting,) Drafting.

renewed to him, by the chaplain of the regiment; the good effect of this meaſure, if it were, on deſertion alone, might be conſiderable.

Chaplain and Schoolmaſter.

NINTH. The office of chaplain ought to be reſtored to the ſervice; a chaplain ſhould be appointed to each regiment of artillery and cavalry, and to each battalion, or at leaſt to each regiment of infantry, with ſuch an adequacy of pay, (fifteen ſhillings per day, without a deduction,) as ſhall enſure his reſpectability of character, and his conſtant attendance at the head quarters of his corps; it is unneceſſary to point out how eſſentially their attention to duty, (and by their being placed under the controul of a biſhop, this may be enforced,) will contribute to the good order of the ſervice in general, and to the morality of every regiment in particular*. It is unaccountable how a military eſtabliſhment, which is founded on the principle of ſacrificing life and earthly conſiderations, ſhould have ſo long exiſted without more attention having been drawn towards this main-ſpring of good conduct and diſcipline. Under bad regulations however, the appointment of chaplains may be

* The regimental chaplains ſhould be competent to inſtruct the officers in thoſe points which are ſubjects for examination at the boards ſuggeſted in page 43.

pro-

productive of injury equally to religion and to decorum.

A ſchool-maſter ought likewiſe to be allowed to each regiment and battalion, with rank and pay as a ſtaff ſerjeant. Means of giving general inſtruction, particularly to ſoldiers' children, of forming excellent non-commiſſioned officers, and ultimately officers for the ſervice, will be thus afforded to every corps.

TENTH. It is conjectured, that a conſider- Clothing.
able ſaving might enſue to the public, if the clothing of the army were undertaken by government, in lieu of the colonels of regiments, after the manner practiſed in Auſtria. At all events, it ſeems expedient that the ſtoppages ſhould be limited to the actual ſtrength of each regiment. It is, at the ſame time foreſeen, that public contracts are open to abuſes of many deſcriptions, and it muſt be allowed, that the Britiſh army is the beſt and moſt regularly clothed in Europe.

Diſtinction in clothing is of more importance than may at firſt appear neceſſary. His Majeſty's guards ought not be clothed like the reſt of the army. It is recommended that they

ſhould retain the preſent dreſs of breeches and long gaiters, but that the red pantaloon, of a cloth the ſame as the jacket, ſhould be univerſally adopted for the regiments of the line; the article is more convenient on ſervice, and will have a martial appearance; the white breeches ſhould likewiſe be worn by the heavy dragoons only; the blue pantaloons to be entirely ſubſtituted for breeches in the light cavalry, and not *both* admitted.

Bounty. ELEVENTH. No part of our preſent ſyſtem more ſtrongly marks the miſtaken principles on which it has proceeded, than the circumſtance of the high bounties which are now giving for recruits in every deſcription of our land forces, and the neceſſity which has ariſen of alluring men into the army by pecuniary motives, and by enormous bribes; if the enliſtment of men be conducted on principles of commerce, a market price muſt be given for the article *man*, and a limit might, with equal propriety, be offered to that of corn, or any other commodity; if the trade of a ſoldier were made as good as it ought to be, it may not be too much to aſſert, that no bounty whatever would be neceſſary; it ought, at all events, to be only ſufficient to defray the expence of neceſſaries, (which neceſſa-

ries

ries ſhould be furniſhed no where but at the head-quarrters of a regiment,) with the *douceur* of one guinea to a recruit on enliſting, and another on joining his comrades and company; including one guinea for all party expences, the ſum total ought not to exceed *ſix guineas*, or pounds*; for all transfers of men from one corps to another, the only gratuity ſhould be *one guinea*.

Any deviation from this moderate rate of bounty will aſſuredly tend to encourage deſertion, and to increaſe that general immorality, to which, under the beſt regulations, the recruiting ſervice gives too much encouragement†.

TWELFTH. Much as has been expreſſed by men of reflection againſt the inſtitution of orders of merit, and badges of diſtinction, upon the ground of public eſtimation being the only ſolid reward for virtuous actions, yet if the army be raiſed to a ſuperior character, theſe honors and diſtinctions, diſtributed with judgement, may have the moſt ſalutary effect. Order of Merit.

* It ought to be the same for every description of force.

† As the marines will probably be placed on a footing similar to that of the regular army, the same advantages may be expected to ensue to these corps, both in the facility of their procuring recruits, and in the diminution of bounty.

Ambition and the love of diſtinction are the ruling paſſions of ſoldiers, prompting them to encounter every hardſhip, they are, in fact, the beſt ſupport to every perilous profeſſion, and the means of bringing forth the moſt arduous exertions, at a price the leaſt expenſive to every ſtate. The inſtitution of military orders has prevailed from the earlieſt days of hiſtory, and approaches at preſent almoſt to uniformity in every army, our own excepted, throughout Europe.

Excluſive of the gift of *honorary arms*, (ſwords,) which ſhould be diſtributed to officers and to non-commiſſioned officers, at the diſcretion of his Majeſty*, *two diſtinct* orders of merit ſhould be inſtituted, of which the officers and ſoldiers ſhould equally be members, in different ſtages of each order; the *one* to denote length of ſervice without ſtain; and the *other* to be confined to acts of valour; in both caſes however, the circumſtance which ſhall give a title to become a member of the order muſt be preciſely ſpecified, and not left to the judgment or partiality of any board, or individual†; the rewards

* This honor to be conferred by recommendation of commanders of corps, through the commander in chief of the forces.

† This was the case among the Romans of old, and is now observed in the Austrian army.

in

in order to be impreſſive, muſt be few, as in the *order for ſervice.*

For officers, Twenty-five years, without cenſure by court martial.

For ſoldiers, Completion of ſecond period, never puniſhed corporally; — never deſerted; been eleven years a non-commiſſioned officer, &c. &c.

In the Order of Valor,

For officers, With inferior force, having overcome ſuperior, and having exceeded the mere line of duty, &c. &c.

For ſoldiers, The ſame as for officers.

Regular certificates of claims to theſe orders, to be tranſmitted to the Commander in Chief, and if finally approved of by His Majeſty, to be inſerted, for ſoldiers as well as for officers, in the Gazette: a college to be inſtituted for the record of theſe military honors.

SECTION II.

ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS.

amble. ALL ſpeculation upon the propriety of any other deſcription of force, for every operation of war, than a regular army, lies ſo much open to diverſity of opinion, that there can be but little ſatisfaction in ſuggeſting any thing, in ſo dubious a caſe: there certainly may be, in this, as poſſibly in every other country, a large proportion of men, whoſe voluntary ſervices will never be obtained, in the firſt inſtance, beyond the limits of home poſſeſſions. Is this, however, really the caſe? or would not the ſame propenſity to a military life, which leads men to a limited ſervice, rather induce them to engage at once in that which is more general, if there exiſted no other? If this be proved, it muſt be abſurd to have *two* deſcriptions of force in order to effect *one* ſingle purpoſe. Granting, however, that the former ſuppoſition is the correct one,

one, (for amidſt the confuſed and compulſory modes, whereby our limited forces have hitherto been raiſed, it is impoſſible to decide one way or other;) the next conſideration muſt be, whether it is better to have that force aſſimilated in every reſpect, except extent of ſervice, to the regular army, or to have it as the militia, raiſed by local influence, more limited in its ſervice, and commanded by individuals of rank and property, not appointed by the Crown; in the one caſe the force will, in point of diſcipline, be more efficient, the nation will conſequently have moſt value from it *for its coſt;* in the other, there may be more facility in recruiting it, and much weight will be given to the conteſt in which we are engaged, by inducing the moſt important individuals in the country to draw the ſword in its defence; this appears to be the impartial ſtatement of the caſe.

After the ſentiments expreſſed in the introduction to theſe "Outlines," the Author need not ſtate to which force he gives the preference: he is averſe to a militia, even if continued by recruiting as for the line, not only on account of its being ſo little diſpoſable, but on account of its officers, being individuals, whoſe general avocations will never, in ſpite of the genuine

military

military ſpirit of ſome among them, fail to divert their attention from profeſſional duties.

He, therefore, propoſes that the home force, and to which he would continue the term of *additional force*, ſhould be raiſed by recruiting,* as for the regular army, and in order to aſſimilate it as much as poſſible to that force that it ſhould be attached, as *third* battalions, to the regiments of the line.

Additional battalions.

Theſe battalions ſhould be of the ſame ſtrength as each of the ſervice battalions, diſtinguiſhed companies be formed on their right, but without additional pay, and the roſter of officers to be the ſame throughout the three battalions: this ſhould be the ſtrength of each regiment of infantry during war time. The period of enliſtment ſhould be for *ſeven* years, a diſcharge invariably following, except during war: in this caſe, whatever time a ſoldier may have been retained beyond the expiration of his term, will be credited to him, as in the general ſervice: every ſoldier having completed *fourteen* years, or two periods, in the additional battalions, ought to receive the ſame penſion as is granted

* Chiefly confined to counties which give the name to the regiment.

to

to the general ſervice ſoldier after his firſt period; having completed *twenty-one* years, or three periods, he ſhould receive the penſion of the ſecond period of the general ſervice, and in addition, have the right of ſettlement, and of exerciſing a trade. As nearly the whole of the national rewards and privileges ſhould be confined to the ſervices of the regular army, no increaſe of pay, from period to period, no order of merit, except for valor, and no right of voting for a member of parliament appear due to thoſe who engage in this limited ſervice, which ought to be conſidered more as a *reſerve* and nurſery for the line, than as an efficient part of it. As an encouragement, however, for them to engage in the general ſervice battalions, every year paſſed in the additional battalions ſhould be credited as a half year in the former: general permiſſion ſhould be given for them to transfer their ſervices, and the transfer bounty (one guinea) will accompany the new engagement. The extent of the ſervice of the additional battalions will be the ſame, as at preſent; and it is propoſed that the fifty ſeven battalions, now generally attached to regiments as their ſecond battalions, become their third, and that *all* infantry regiments of the line be, without exception, equaliſed to the eſtabliſh-

ment

ment of two *general*, and *one home* ſervice, battalions. It need ſcarcely be added that the ſervice already performed by each man, in the preſent additional force, ought to be credited to him (from his firſt enliſting) for the periods now regulated. This home force will conſiſt ſolely of infantry. The bounty given to recruits will be the ſame, and for reaſons ſpecified in page 52, as that for the regular army: a diſtinction in clothing ought to be made; this ſhould be confined to the pantaloon, which in the *additional battalions* in lieu of red ought to be *blue*: the Hungarian Corps are thus diſtinguiſhed from the Auſtrian. The regulations reſpecting the permanent depôts, in page 36, will prove of equal benefit, and accommodation to the additional battalions.

---

nount of ces.

The preceding ſections having compriſed the whole of the Author's ſuggeſtions relative to the levy and organization of what may be termed the *regular land forces*, circumſtances will, of courſe, decide, as to the amount of theſe ſtanding armies: if the numerous forces of our enemy be however conſidered, the amount of our population, and that of ſome part of our preſent levies, which it is propoſed to reduce, or rather

to

to transfer, the following eſtimate may not be too great, for the war eſtabliſhment:

		Bns.	*R. F.*
1100 Regiments of infantry	general ſervice	200	200,000
	home ſervice	100	100,000
	Total		300,000

If to theſe be added the three hundred recruiting companies, the *ſix* regiments of horſe and foot guards, the twenty-five regiments of cavalry, the ten battalions of artillery, (it may be expedient to form an additional battalion) the veteran battalions, the waggon, gun drivers, and ſtaff corps, &c. the total may be eſtimated at 360,000 rank and file.

The Foreign and Colonial corps, which may be eſtimated at 35,000 rank and file, excluſive of the Eaſt India Company's army, have not been included in the above, and will give to the Government a ſolid force of nearly 400,000 rank and file: the ſooner, however, that the ſyſtem of admitting foreign corps, as a component part of our military eſtabliſhment be relinquiſhed, probably the better; they are as expenſive as our own levies, and Great Britain is, of all nations, that which neither requires, or ought to have Foreign corps.

have foreign mercenaries. The circumſtances under which the Hanoverian regiments have been taken into our ſervice are peculiar; theſe corps certainly merit an exception.

Although it be impolitic to have *whole corps* of foreigners, yet the admiſſion of a certain proportion of *aliens* into our regiments, and giving them, in addition to naturalization, the ſame rewards for faithful ſervice as to our own troops, may, under ſtrict regulations, as to their admiſſion, be productive of national benefit. With regard to the Eaſt India Company's army, a period may, ere long, arrive when it may be judged expedient to take the whole ſyſtem of defence in India into the hands of Government.

The whole amount of the preceding eſtimates is conſiderably leſs than the oſtenſible numbers now reported to Parliament, but it muſt ever be remembered, that the merit of armies depends on their compoſition, on their diſpoſable nature, and not on a formidable array of numerical figures: the moſt alarming feature, perhaps, of our preſent land force is the inefficiency of it, when contraſted with its nominal amount.

Peace eſtabliſhment.

It is conceived that the ſyſtem, which has been propoſed, ſuggeſts the means of forming the

he future peace eſtabliſhment of the army on a ery ſimple plan: all battalions may progreſ- ively be reduced to any ſtandard of numbers, ot below 600 rank and file each, and if further eduction be required, the ſecond and third bat- alions of junior corps may be diſbanded in *toto*, ut no weaker eſtabliſhment, for thoſe which emain can be adviſable: excluſive of the greater acility of procuring officers of talent to com- mand regiments and battalions, when leſs nu- merous, the variety of uniform, latitude of think- ng, and in the ſtile of command, among a mul- iplicity of weak corps, cauſe each to form, as t were, a ſeparate diviſion in an army, and to ecome a diſtinct point of diſtraction; hence the trength of the French and Auſtrian *diviſions*, he *legions* of the Romans, &c. and from the ame motive large regiments have been recom- nended in theſe "Outlines."

The regiments of cavalry ought not, during eace, to be reduced below two-thirds of their war eſtabliſhment.

SECTION III.

VOLUNTEER AND SUBSIDIARY FORCE.

IT has been ſtated, in the introduction, that the leſs a military force is *regular* and *diſpoſable*, the leſs is its value: if it be doubtful whether any deſcription of force, excluſively for home defence, be worthy of much attention, it is equally ſo, whether much reliance is to be placed on volunteer corps, or on a levy en maſſe.

The circumſtance which ought to decide, as to the merit of either, is the *expence:* in exact proportion as theſe levies coſt little or nothing to the ſtate, do not impede the recruiting for the army, and do not obſtruct the *productive* induſtry of the country, is their value: the more that the nation is armed, and the greater intereſt that every man takes in keeping out the common enemy, decidedly the better: the queſtion

queſtion is not, therefore, whether arms ſhall be entruſted to the great maſs of the people, for if there be danger in this, all plans will be equally futile, but whether the pecuniary reſources of the country are adequate to ſo many various deſcriptions of armed bodies? the ſtate of our finances anſwers this in the negative, and oblige us to limit our pecuniary aid, if any is to be derived from the ſtate for ſo ſecondary an object, to that proportion of irregular force, which ſhall decidedly be the moſt uſeful: to the remainder every encouragement may be given, excepting *money.*

The force which moſt immediately claims that aid, appears to be the yeomanry cavalry in both kingdoms, and the yeomanry infantry in Ireland. In the event of the regular cavalry being much reduced, the former will be eſſentially neceſſary; in aid of the civil power, as a branch of the *poſſe comitatus;* and, ſhould invaſion enſue, for the military purpoſes of eſcort, convoy, or as guides, a ſelect deſcription of them may be highly uſeful: in Ireland, the yeomanry infantry may alſo be of eſſential ſervice for the ſame objects. The preſent ſyſtem, however, requires amendment and *economizing*: the allowances are too great; perſons of more ſubſtance,

 (principals,)

(*principals*,) ought alone to be admitted; the days of muſter ſhould be regularly *fixed* by lieutenants of counties at ſtated periods; the enrolment of each individual ſhould be for the *year*; ſevere fines ſhould be levied for non-attendance at muſter; no permanent duty ſhould be admitted, and twenty-four days annual drill be deemed ſufficient.

The cavalry ſhould be cloathed in *red*, and the Iriſh infantry, like the armed aſſociations, in *blue*.

All other volunteer corps, whether of cavalry or infantry, ſhould be termed *armed aſſociations*: they will probably come forward only in large towns and populous diſtricts, but ought to be generally encouraged, particularly in the metropolis, in diſtant parts of the kingdom, and in ſea-ports: they ſhould produce no charge to the ſtate, excepting for arms, accoutrements, and ammunition: their clothing ſhould be uniform, in both kingdoms, and as during the laſt war, conſiſt of *blue coats*.

It ſeems indiſpenſable that the uſual gradations of rank, expreſſed in the cuſtomary terms of field officers, captains, &c. ſhould be continued

tinued to all volunteer corps, according to their numbers, but that no volunteer officer ſhould have command of an officer of the line, who is above the rank of captain: the gradation of command ſhould afterwards be by the next rank in juniority.*

All volunteer corps to be under the generals of diſtricts, and report to them monthly: the yeomanry to be under the inſpection of officers appointed by government: the aſſociations under that of the generals of diſtricts.

It follows, from theſe regulations, that all pecuniary allowances, which are at preſent granted to the whole of the volunteer infantry in Great Britain, and to a conſiderable portion in Ireland, for drill and inſpection days,—for clothing,—for care of arms, and for their permanent ſerjeants, ſhould ceaſe, and that all future expences and contingencies, be defrayed by thoſe individuals, who may ſtill continue their patriotic ſervices.

* Lieutenant-colonel of yeomanry or armed associations, to command a captain, major to command a lieutenant, and captain to command an ensign of the line.

With regard to a plan for training to arms, or, what is perhaps, of equal importance, for having the names enrolled of a certain proportion of the population, who may be called upon in event of invaſion, the principle is good, in as much as it entruſts arms to the nation at large: it is open, however, to numerous objections; it can never amount to any thing valuable, in point of military inſtruction, without great expence, and it will unſettle the minds, and obſtruct the productive labour of a large portion of the community: whether it may ultimately aid the regular army, by giving it a ſuppoſed propenſity to the military profeſſion, is equally doubtful, for few fly to arms through *amor patriæ* alone, or contract partiality for a muſket, when accompanied by the ſmock frock and peaſants clothing: at all events, if the meaſure be a compulſory one, it is feared that the diſadvantages attending it will increaſe ten-fold: thoſe who attend muſt receive pay, the ſhow of confidence in the national patriotiſm will be loſt, individual oppreſſion, for ſubſtitutes, will be greatly felt, (for perſonal ſervice will, of courſe, not be reſorted to,) and the general interruption to induſtry, may rather create an averſion, than a partiality for the profeſſion of arms.

As

As the ſpontaneous act of a certain proportion of each claſs*, who may be diſpoſed for little or no pecuniary conſideration, annually to enrol themſelves, and ſubmit to a portion of military inſtruction, a ſubſidiary force, or in other words, an *armed peaſantry*, may have ſome merit. In this caſe, the times of aſſembly muſt be fixed by government, and the points of rendezvous in the ſeveral hundreds, or pariſhes, muſt be arranged by the civil adminiſtration, in each county. It is however, matter worthy of much reflection, whether it be not preferable, that the burthenſome duties of war, ſhould be undertaken by that portion of the people only, who may be hired as champions in defence of the reſt, and who, in regular armies, may devote their whole labour to this occupation, than, that the induſtrious part of the community ſhould be perpetually diſturbed, or the tranquil order of ſociety thus unneceſſarily intruded upon.

If the author, however, err in his view of this ſubject, and if it be the intention of govern-

* Mr. Windham proposed, on 3d April, that the population of the country should be classed in three parts for this levy, the oldest person not to exceed the age of 40.

ment

ment to arm the peaſantry of this country, and at the ſame time to retain the militia,* the only mode of giving effect to the former, appears to be through the medium of the local connections of the latter; by cauſing that force to revert to its original inſtitution, and become ſtationary in its counties; by diſtributing a certain portion of its officers and non-commiſſioned officers in the ſeveral hundreds, weapontakes, &c. in each county, for the purpoſe of bringing forward, and training the ſubſidiary force, and by placing it under the control of an inſpecting field officer of the line; by fixing the days and hours of drill, at central points; by requiring the attendance of an inferior civil officer, and exacting diſcipline thro' the medium of fine and impriſonment; by cauſing no man to leave his roll, under the term of one year, except it be to enliſt in the army: and finally by exempting no man from the ballot, if it be a compulſory meaſure, except thoſe who are uſually ſo exempted, and members of the yeomanry and armed aſſociations:

* If the militia be retained, the additional force will, of course, be consolidated with it, when, as the home army, it may be adviseable to give it more solidity, and augment it to 100,000 rank and file: but in this case, the militia must assume a new character, and be returned to its respective counties, to be there quartered in *barracks*.

theſe, and a variety of other regulations will be indiſpenſable: the neceſſity of them, however, proves the extreme difficulty of giving to any ſyſtem of ſubſidiary force, either organization or ſtability; of ever rendering it an object worthy of the expence which it will entail upon the nation, or of preventing it from diverting the attention of government, from plans of national defence, which are infinitely more ſimple in their principle, and more important in their object.

CON-

CONCLUSION.

THESE ſuggeſtions ſhall be cloſed by a few remarks upon that ſubject, the conſideration of which is neceſſarily becoming more and more inſeparable from every meaſure, which relates either to the ſecurity or to the honor of our country, the œconomy of its pecuniary reſources.

A conſiderable increaſe of expence may appear to have been recommended, particularly under the heads of pay, chaplains, penſions and the repetition of bounty, which will enſue from the frequent diſcharges: but on a general review of the whole, it is conceived that many ſources of œconomy will be found to ariſe out of the greater part of the ſyſtem which has been propoſed; theſe may appear fully to juſtify meaſures,

ures, if any juſtification were neceſſary, which ave ultimately moſt important national objects . view.

Among theſe ſources may be conſidered,

1ſt, The reduction of a large body of cavalry, id of the regiments of guards. The diminu- on of expence in the whole volunteer ſyſtem, id the ſmall diminution in the pay of trum- ters and drummers. Cavalry, Volunteers, &c.

2d, The reduction of the ſecond lieutenant olonels, in all regiments of cavalry or infantry, conſequence of the regimental commiſſions ing taken from general officers, and the re- oving one of the lieutenants in every troop company, if the appointment of cadet be ade. Regimental officers.

3d, The diminution of bounty, which from *enty-two* guineas per man now given for recruits, ay, as has been ſtated, be reduced at leaſt to , as ſoon as that partiality for the ſervice ſhall ve been created, which the preceding ſug- ſtions have aimed at effecting, and when the arket for recruits ſhall be ſhut in every other Bounty.

 direction,

direction, than for the regular army or additional battalions.

Deſertion. 4th, The decreaſe of deſertion and the neceſſity of diſcharging ſo many men; the ſerious annual amount of both of which is beſt aſcertained by a reference to the returns laid before the Houſe of Commons; a ſuperior deſcription of men will, it is preſumed, be hereafter induced to follow the profeſſion of arms, and will be preſented with numerous motives for continuing their ſervices in our armies.

Army accounts. And finally, The reduction of various regimental, war office, and agency accounts, in conſequence of the general conſolidation of allowances, contingencies, &c. wherever practicable. The more ſpeedy cloſing of all army accounts whatever. The conſequent diſcharge o clerks, and the reduction of arrears. And, th uniting under one deſcription of agency, that o the regular army, the whole of thoſe numerou offices, which the preſent diverſity of our lan forces has naturally given riſe to, conſiderabl to the injury of the public purſe.

To conclude, in ſhort, with the ſentiment o an author of much ingenuity on theſe ſubject

an

and whoſe ſentiments are worthy of general attention.* "Were our ſyſtem of national defence "reduced to a ſimple and intelligible method, in "which nothing ſhall be admitted, that is not "plainly calculated for national advantage, "abuſes, in the adminiſtration of it, muſt ceaſe "to be practicable, as they will no longer be "capable of concealment."

* Macdiarmid on National Defence.

FINIS.

Printed by C. Roworth, Bell-yard, Temple-bar.